STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DETERRENT

That this House welcomes the ninth report of the 2006-07 session from the Defence Select Committee, which explores the key issues and questions to be addressed in the debate on the future of the nuclear deterrent; specifically notes the arguments set out in chapter 3 and the associated evidence about the timing of the decisions and the distinction which the report highlights between work on `concept options for platforms' and `detailed concept work'; further notes that the 14 year period for the design of the Vanguard submarines commenced from the more advanced stage of `detailed concept', which with this procurement is years rather than months away from the present position, in respect of any future submarine design which Parliament might approve; notes conclusion 7 of the Defence Committee's Fourth Report of session 2006-07 that the UK submarine industry draws on a uniquely skilled and specialist workforce, that retaining that skills base will be essential if the UK decides it wants to continue to design, build and maintain nuclear powered submarines, that the skills base is now at a critical level and that any further erosion of the workforce may have significant implications for the future submarine programme; and further notes recommendation 12 of that report relating to the need for clarity and certainty about the future submarine programme and to demonstrate that the Government has learned the lessons from the Astute programme.